Aditya Mani Tripathi*
Introduction
India’s private detective industry is currently undergoing administrative and regulatory dilemmas. Valued at USD 95.19 million in 2025, India’s private detective services industry is expected to reach USD 376.29 million in valuation by 2032. Investigations concerning matrimonial issues remain one of the most popular client bases for private investigators. Despite working at the very boundary of fundamental rights, this industry remains subject to a clear statutory vacuum that is silent on privacy violations, accountability and licensing mechanisms for private investigation agencies.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in Himanshu Chordia v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2026 INSC 778), while adjudicating an unrelated maintenance dispute, observed this statutory vacuum in the private detectives industry while citing personal privacy and due process issues arising out of this statutory void.
This article analyses the critical statutory gap in the regulation of private investigation services. It incorporates constitutional analysis and international precedents and ultimately provides pragmatic recommendations to solve this legislative gap.
Regulatory Gaps and Legal Challenges
The prevailing concerns, as highlighted by Himanshu Chordia, indicate a large compendium of issues affecting people’s rights. Presently, any individual can identify themselves as a private investigator due to the absence of any licensing framework or regulatory authority.
Moreover, there exists no clear statutory difference between legitimate investigative practices and offences like stalking, voyeurism, extortion and illegal wiretapping. Such a regulatory void can lead to unvetted actors posing themselves as investigators without any due background checks, a lack of a professional code of conduct and violations of the rights of the people who are allegedly investigated by them.
Moreover, courts routinely have to view the evidence obtained by these private investigators which largely raises issues regarding the custody of the evidence, the procedure used to obtain it, whether the said evidence was tampered with or not by any means and whether it violates the person’s privacy in any form, for which no standard legislation exists.
It is critical to note that inNavinchandra N.Majithia vs State of Meghalaya and Ors., 2000 (AIR 2000 SC 3275), it was held that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) does not recognise private investigating agencies. It was also held that any such evidence collected by private investigation cannot be presented by the public prosecutor in any trial, but the same can be presented by the party claiming a defence.
Constitutional Analysis: The Duty to Legislate
When the legislature is silent in establishing laws pertaining to an issue, the Constitution of India becomes the way forward, guiding public policy and securing the people’s rights.
Collection of ocular evidence and phone tappings are primarily linked to the violation of a person’s Right to privacy. In Justice K.S.Puttaswamy(Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India, 2017 (AIR 2017 SC 4161), the right to privacy was held to be an integral part of an individual’s right to Life and Liberty under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, and that any state action violating privacy should be sanctioned by law, necessary for a legitimate aim, the extent of interference should be proportionate to the need of such interference and that procedural guarantees must exist against the use of such interference.
The major issue with this precedent was that it largely regulates state action and does not deal with private entities like private investigators and detectives. For this, in Kaushal Kishore v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2023 (2023) 4 SCC 1, the Supreme Court held that a fundamental right under Article 19 or 21 of the Indian Constitution can be enforced even against the state and its instrumentalities by virtue of horizontal application against private individuals. This clearly indicates that Article 21’s protection is not confined to the state and its instrumentalities alone, though the mechanism by which it can be enforced against private conduct needs further discourse.
In Kaushal Kishore, the Supreme Court has noted that fundamental rights under Article 19 or 21 may not be justiciable horizontally before constitutional courts except those rights which may have been statutorily recognised in accordance with the applicable law. Academicians believe that this dictum enables the state to enforce indirect horizontal application of Article 21 and 19, by virtue of which the state has a positive obligation to protect the rights of the people through statutory mechanisms against private individuals rather than relying merely on constitutional writs.
This observation strengthens the need for separate legislation determining limits of legitimate investigation and the conduct of private investigators, as it would be unfeasible to utilise constitutional writs as a means to enforce them when such issues arise even more predominantly in the future, thus warranting the need for separate legislation dealing with these issues specifically.
The Private Security Agencies (Regulation) Act, 2005 governs the private security services sector. This sector is closely analogous to the private investigation sector and is regulated by specific legislation that mandates licensing, background checks and standardised conduct norms for private security services. Private investigators are commonly engaged in surveillance and data gathering and are hence more privacy-invasive than individuals engaged in private security services, and yet no specific statute regulates them.
In The State of West Bengal vs Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 (AIR 1952 SC 75), it was held that state action needs to comply with the test of intelligible differentia and have a rational nexus behind such classification for it to be deemed in conformity with Article 14 of the Constitution that provides equality before the law. It is argued that making specific legislation regulating private security services while omitting the same for the private investigations industry raises an issue of substantial arbitrariness due to the underinclusive decisions of the state.
It is pivotal to consider that in The State of Gujarat and Another vs Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (AIR 1974 SC 1300)it was reiterated that legislation should not be disturbed unnecessarily unless the courts clearly observe no fair reason for non-inclusion of the unincluded group. By this principle, regulation of private security agencies while having no dedicated statute for private investigators could be seen as sequential policy-making rather than bare unconstitutional omission.
This characterisation does not withstand scrutiny when the Private Detective Agencies (Regulation) Bill 2007 is observed. Parliament has not failed to consider regulating private investigators as a form of incremental legislation; rather, the need for regulating private investigation services was noted in 2007 itself but was not enacted formally. This is not a form of sequential policy-making permitted in Ambica Mills but rather is a demonstrated instance of selective exclusion. The effect of this exclusion was so substantial that it led the Supreme Court of India to state its own observations pertaining to this statutory vacuum.
The Private Detective Agencies (Regulation) Bill, 2007 aimed to regulate and provide licenses to private detective agencies in the nation. It aimed to establish clear criteria required for a person to be engaged in private investigation and aimed to penalise privacy violations. The bill was introduced in Parliament but was never enacted as a binding statute. Almost two decades later, there exists a clear statutory vacuum that needs to be addressed to protect the fundamental rights of the people from being violated by private investigation agencies in light of the evolving jurisprudence of privacy and due process.
Similarly, other professions like medical professionals, legal professionals, and chartered accountants that operate in a similar information-sensitive vicinity to private investigators are guided and regulated by individual norms and authorities. These authorities ensure proper codes of conduct and provide accountability mechanisms to uphold their profession’s nobility and the rights of the public simultaneously. On the other hand, private investigation agencies are currently operating without any such norms. This selective inaction violates the test of intelligible differentia and rational nexus, hence mandating the creation of a statute that properly codifies the roles, responsibilities, eligibility, accountability and conduct of the private investigation services.
Comparative Analysis of International Regulatory Frameworks
In Himanshu Chordia, the Supreme Court had suggested referring to the laws of Queensland, Singapore, Ontario and the Netherlands for creating appropriate legislation for India regarding private investigation services.
In Queensland, Australia, private investigators are governed by the Security Providers Act, 1993. Private investigators are required to undergo a licensing process which is governed by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). A Security Provider Licence (Class 1) is also required for engaging in investigative work. Major eligibility criteria include 18 years of age, completion of approved competent training and a clean criminal record.
In Ontario, Canada, private investigation services are regulated by the Private Security and Investigative Services Act, 2005. The said statute makes it mandatory for private investigators to carry their licenses and to present them to individuals when asked for. The said Act also prohibits private investigators from posing as performing duties and services connected to police officials.
In the Netherlands, private investigation services are regulated by the Private Security Organisations and Detective Agencies Act (the WPBR). The said legislation separates private security agencies into security firms/ departments, private investigation firms, firms transporting valuables and money, private alarm centres and video surveillance centres. This classification ensures that the roles and liabilities of people engaged in security are not the same as those of those engaged in private investigation services.
In Singapore, private investigators are governed by the Private Security Industry Act, 2007, wherein licensing is governed by the Singapore Police Force. A private investigator can engage in practices including acquiring and giving information about a person, searching for missing people, obtaining and providing information regarding the causes and origin of libels, fires, loss/accident or any damage to real or personal property and obtaining evidence that can be used in civil and criminal suits.
These international precedents act as a working model of private investigation services regulation that will hold persuasive value while devising public policy for the same in India.
Recommendations for reform and Conclusion
It is argued that any legislative action on addressing this statutory vacuum regarding the private investigation services industry should contain provisions related to licensing, entry, code of conduct, grievance redressal and privacy at the least.
Mirroring the already existing Private Security Agencies (Regulation) Act, 2005, provisions for private investigation agencies that enable a competent authority to control licensing procedures could be a viable option. This would draw inspiration from the Netherlands’ laws that separate security professionals from private investigators.
The legislative framework should also incorporate entry standards, a basic code of conduct and restrictions on private investigators. Inspiration can be drawn from Queensland’s mandatory training requirements and the presence of a clean criminal record as a basic eligibility criterion. Similarly, restricting what tasks can be performed by private investigators, analogous to Singapore’s laws, can be useful for transparency.
Provisions for mandatory disclosure of a licence and compulsion to always carry one’s private investigator licence should be made to ensure only recognised and competent individuals undertake the tasks of a private investigator and prohibit them from undertaking tasks bestowed on police officials. Such laws, similar to Ontario’s regulations, can be a useful deterrent against fraudulent practices and conduct.
Moreover, the conduct of private investigators should prohibit disproportionate covert surveillance and comply with people’s right to privacy and their legitimate expectations. Moreover, compliance with the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, should be strictly ensured. This would enable utilisation of private investigation services for legitimate purposes only. Similarly, provisions for redressing grievances effectively should be formulated.
The legislation should also prescribe rules directing private investigators to maintain a proper chain of custody of any gathered material along with its date, purpose and method of collection. A proper record of the same should be mandated to ensure compliance with evidence laws before the courts.
Ultimately, private investigation services are expected to grow in popularity over time. It is thus necessary to ensure that this sector is regulated properly by statutory mechanisms. As in Himanshu Chordia, the Supreme Court of India observes the need for appropriate statutes for better adjudication; this need is also backed by constitutional mandates of the state. Thus, Legislation should be enacted that balances genuine investigative requirements with statutory regulations, procedural due process and individual dignity.
* The author is a third- year Law student at the Lloyd Law College. The author may be contacted at adityamanitripathi2024-29@lloydlawcollege.edu.in.
This blog reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of The Policy Chronicle.